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ABSTRACT 
Possibilistic logic has been proposed as a numerical formalism for reasoning with 
uncertainty. There has been interest in developing qualitative accounts of possibility, as 
well as an explanation of the relationship between possibility and modal logics. We 
present wo modal logics that can be used to represent and reason with qualitative 
statements ofpossibility and necessity. These logics have a natural semantics based on a 
qualitative abstraction of possibility distributions. Within this modal framework, we are 
able to identify interesting relationships among possibilistic logic, beliefs, and condition- 
als. In particular, we demonstrate hat possibilistic logic natural~ induces a notion of 
belief identical to that of the widely used epistemic logic weak $5, and that current 
approaches to conditional default reasoning and belief revision can be mapped into 
possibilistic logic, including the means of conditional reasoning based on high probabili- 
ties investigated by Adams [1] and Pearl [2, 3]. 
KEYWORDS:  Possibility theory, modal logic, belief logics, conditionals, de- 
fault reasoning, belief revision, high probability 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a great deal of  interest in the relationship between 
numerical and nonnumerical approaches to uncertain reasoning in artifi- 
cial intelligence (AI). While numerical methods, for instance, those based 
on classical probability theory, tend to be more general than their qualita- 
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tive counterparts (e.g., proposals for symbolic default reasoning), these 
qualitative systems can be useful when reasoning "numerically" is compu- 
tationally or expressively intractable, and they help illuminate the underly- 
ing structure of such reasoning. Possibility theory has been proposed as 
one such numerical formalism for reasoning under uncertainty (see Dubois 
and Prade [4] for an introduction). It is based on the notion of necessity 
measures, which determine the degree of certainty associated with an item 
of belief, and the dual possibility measures, determining the degree of 
surprise associated with (or the willingness to accept) a potential belief. 
Possibility theory has proven to be remarkably robust and has found 
application in a number of areas in AI, ranging from default reasoning [5] 
to reasoning about linguistic quantifiers [6]. 
Naturally, qualitative accounts of possibility theory have been proposed 
and shown to capture the underlying structure of possibility and necessity 
measures [7]. Qualitative possibility theory is presented as a set of postu- 
lates that constrain any reasonable ordering of possibility on sentences. 
Such qualitative characterizations give us the ability to express possibilistic 
relationships without having to assume particular numerical values, relying 
only on the relative possibility of propositions. This qualitative relationship 
is especially important in possibility theory, because changing the absolute 
magnitude of degrees of possibility has little effect on key inferential 
relations, as long as the relative magnitudes remain fixed (contrast his 
with probability theory where such latitude does not exist). 
Accepting the utility of qualitative possibility, a logic of qualitative 
possibility becomes crucial if we wish to derive consequences based on 
partial information. Given constraints on the relationship between certain 
propositions (e.g., their relative possibility), certain other constraints may 
be required to hold on any suitable possibility measure. A logical calculus 
permits us to specify a partial (qualitative) possibility measure and derive 
information implicit in the specification. We can thus reason without 
requiring complete information. This is crucial from the point of view of 
AI, for reasoning with incomplete information is the norm. Of course, we 
require a logic with sufficient expressive power to capture the types of 
constraints that might be required in a knowledge base. One such possi- 
bilistic logic is developed in [8]. Others have provided logics in which 
logical constraints on probabilities can be specified in an analogous fashion 
(see, e.g., [9, 10], though these retain the quantitative aspects of probabili- 
ties). 
Given the nature of necessity and possibility measures, the connection 
to modal logics is also of great interest [4]. Modal logics have been 
developed, to a large extent, to capture the notions of possibility and 
necessity [11]; hence, it seems natural to expect some close relationship. In 
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this study, we present a family of modal logics for representing and 
reasoning with assertions of relative (qualitative) possibility and necessity 
and other constraints on these qualitative orderings. We will concentrate 
on two modal ogics, CO and CO*, in which we can faithfully represent the 
notions of qualitative necessity and possibility. These representations will 
respect he essential qualities of possibility and necessity measures. The 
expressive power we need to capture possibilistic logic is achieved with two 
modalities: the usual D, corresponding to truth at accessible worlds; and 
the less standard t2, expressing truth at inaccessible worlds. We note that, 
in contrast o many multimodal logics used in knowledge representation, 
the additional modality carries no excess emantical baggage. Our seman- 
tics is based on the usual Kripke structures for monomodal logics, the 
added modal operator increasing only our ability to constrain the form of 
such structures. The correspondence does not use the (perhaps expected) 
mapping of qualitative necessity and possibility into the operators [] and 
£>. However, we provide other operators, defined using [] and [], that do 
capture these absolute notions. In particular, we will define in our logics a 
modal operator for belief and show the tight correspondence between 
qualitative possibility and the usual notion of epistemic possibility. 
Aside from demonstrating that simple modal logics can be used to 
express qualitative possibility, embedding possibilistic logic into CO and 
CO* also illustrates important connections to a number of other for- 
malisms for defeasible reasoning. These systems can also be embedded 
into our logics; among them are conditional approaches to default reason- 
ing [12], e-semantics [1, 2], belief revision [13], counterfactual logics [14], 
and autoepistemic logic [15, 16]. 
In the next section we discuss qualitative possibility and present the 
logics CO and CO*. We show how these logics may be used to represent 
qualitative possibility. In section 3, we examine the connections between 
possibilistic logic and some other systems for defeasible reasoning. One 
interesting connection is to the modal logic KD45 (weak $5), the most 
commonly used logic for knowledge and belief in AI. In fact, we demon- 
strate that possibility theory naturally induces an epistemic logic that is 
exactly KD45. However, our logic allows us to show even stronger connec- 
tions to autoepistemic logic [15], the nonmonotonic counterpart of KD45. 
Also of particular interest is a conditional connective, definable in our 
logics, that is identical to that proposed by Adams [1] for reasoning with 
high probabilities. The relationship between possibility theory and Adams's 
logic has been examined independently by Dubois and Prade [17], but our 
formulation has independent motivation, and lends itself to a complete 
calculus of conditionals. Furthermore, the expressive power of our logics 
allows us to formulate important properties directly in the object language. 
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2. A MODAL REPRESENTATION OF POSSIBILITY 
2.1. Possibilistic Logic 
Possibilistic logic has been developed to a considerable extent by Dubois 
and Prade (see [4] for a survey), and is intended to capture a form of 
uncertainty or degree of belief associated with the beliefs or facts in a 
knowledge base KB. Assume we have some underlying classical proposi- 
tional language in which we are able to express these items of belief. A 
possibility measure 1I maps the sentences of this language into the real 
interval [0, 1]. The value I I(A) is intended to represent he degree of 
possibility of A. We take this to capture the amount of surprise associated 
with adopting A as an epistemic possibility. If I I (A )= 1 there is no 
surprise associated with A - - i t  is completely possible (i.e., A is consistent 
with the agent's beliefs). If I I (A) < 1, then some degree of surprise is 
associated with learning A; we take this to mean that ~ A is believed, for 
A is not an epistemic possibility. At the extreme, I I(A) = 0 indicates that 
surprise is maximal (i.e., an agent would never adopt A as a possibility, or 
would never give up belief in -7 A). A possibility measure must satisfy the 
following three properties: 
1. I - I(T)= 1 
2. II(_L) = 0 
3. I I(A v B) = max(II(A), II(B)) 
A necessity measure N is a similar mapping, associating with A a degree 
of necessity. We take N(A)  to represent the willingness of an agent o give 
up belief in A (or the degree of entrenchment of A in a belief set; see 
section 4). Necessity measures are constrained by: 
1. N(T)  = 1 
2. N(_L) = 0 
3. N(A  A B) = min(N(A), N(B)) 
If N(A)  = 1 then A is fully entrenched and can never be given up, while 
N(A)  = 0 indicates that A is not believed at all) Naturally, the willing- 
ness of an agent to give up a belief A should be related to the degree of 
surprise associated with accepting ~ A as an epistemic possibility, for 
giving up A is just accepting ~ A as possible. Indeed, one may define 
1 The constraint N(±)  = 0 has been relaxed by some authors to allow for some degree of 
inconsistency handling; in other words, we may have that a contradictory sentence is given 
some positive necessity or "degree of belief." We will not consider this generalization here. 
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necessity measures using the identity 
N(A) = 1 - H(--1 A). 
Possibility and necessity measures can be seen, intuitively, as refining 
the usual conception of belief and epistemic possibility by allowing one to 
specify the "extent" to which a sentence is believed or is possible. For 
example, imagine a knowledge base KB containing the information A 
(Anne will come to the party) and C (Cheryl will come to the party). 
According to the interpretation provided above, both A and C have a 
positive degree of necessity. While a standard belief logic provides the 
same capability, a necessity measure captures the idea that certain beliefs 
can be held more firmly than others. This information would be crucial if 
the agent in possession of KB were to learn, for instance, that one of 
Anne or Cheryl will stay at home, that is, ~(A  A C). If degrees of 
necessity are assigned to the beliefs in KB, the agent can decide which of 
A or C (or both) to retract to permit the incorporation of the new 
information. If N(A) = .6 and N(C) = .4 then the belief A is held more 
firmly and the new knowledge base will reflect this fact by retaining A and 
giving up C. It might be the case that the consequence of KB A --- C is 
held more strongly than either A or C (e.g., N(A = C) = .8 and N(A) = 
N(C) = .4). In this case, the belief A = C will be retained and, as a result, 
both A and C will be retracted. Perhaps Anne and Cheryl only go to 
parties together. In what follows, we will look at the relationship among 
possibilistic logic, logics of belief, and belief revision in some detail. 
Semantically, possibility (and necessity) measures can be understood in 
terms of possibility distributions over possible worlds [18]. Assume our 
underlying language is finitely generated and thus corresponds to a finite 
set of valuations or possible worlds W. 2 A distribution 7r assigns to each 
world a degree of possibility from the interval [0, 1]. A distribution deter- 
mines a possibility measure II via the following relationship: 
I I (A)  = max{~-(w): w ~A}.  
In other words, the degree of possibility of A is just that of the most 
possible A-world. The concept of assigning degrees of possibility to worlds 
will be crucial in our qualitative semantics. 
Qualitative necessity measures are discussed in [8, 19]. Postulates are 
proposed constraining the qualitative relationship A >N B, which is read 
as "A is at least as necessary as B." If we define A >N B to be true just 
2 Thus, we have a finite Boolean algebra of propositions or "events," the Lindenbaum algebra 
of the propositional logic. By imposing additional constraints on possibility measures, this 
finiteness restriction can be relaxed. 
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when N(A) > N(B) for any necessity measure N, then >U will satisfy 
the postulates for qualitative necessity (in finite settings), and these rela- 
tions are the only ones that can be so-defined [7]. A qualitative necessity 
ordering is any ordering satisfying these postulates. 3 
(l~l) A ~N A 
(N2) A >U B orB  >N A 
(N3) If A >U B and B ~N C then A ~N C 
(N4) T >--N 3_ 
(N5) T>_N A for all A 
(N6) I fB>N Cthen  A /XB>N A ACfora l l  A 
Such an ordering is, in fact, a total preordering (or weak ordering) of the 
sentences in the language. In other words, the sentences are ranked 
according to necessity. 
Qualitative possibility orderings are defined using related postulates, 
with A >.  B meaning A is at least as possible as B, or II(A) > II(B). 
The relationship between these qualitative relationships can be given as 
A --~N B iff ~B >.  ~A.  
Farifias and Herzig [8] have axiomatized qualitative possibility in a logic 
called qualitative possibility logic (QPL), in which the relation >.  is 
incorporated as a conditional connective. Using a conditional logic permits 
a rather natural formulation, allowing one to express entences of the form 
A >= B, or Boolean combinations of such sentences, and draw appropri- 
ate conclusions. This appears to be the first logical axiomatization of 
qualitative possibility and, as such, provides many of the advantages we 
expect of a logical calculus. Furthermore, they show QPL is equivalent to 
Lewis's [14] conditional logic VN. 
As mentioned previously, there is also a great deal of interest in a purely 
modal formulation of qualitative possibility. Farifias and Herzig also make 
an initial attempt o develop a modal theory of possibility that uses only 
unary modal operators in place of the conditional ># . Unfortunately, the 
resulting logic PL requires an infinite set of modal operators, each corre- 
sponding to a unique member of the measure set for II. Semantically, each 
operator is evaluated with respect o a separate accessibility relation. This 
certainly permits the expression of qualitative properties like A >~ B, but 
doesn't seem to reflect the qualitative nature of QPL or other qualitative 
postulates. In particular, there is no modal operator corresponding to 
(some degree of) possibility or necessity. 
3 For any ordering _> we propose (e.g. >--N ), the corresponding relations _<, <, and > 
are defined in the standard way. 
Modal Logics for Qualitative Possibility Theory 179 
In the remainder of this section, we present a series of modal logics for 
just this purpose. Aside from demonstrating that qualitative possibility can 
be captured in a modal logic, the logics we present have considerable 
expressive power, allowing us to represent constraints and conditions on 
possibility orderings that cannot be captured in a purely conditional ogic 
formulation. 
2.2. Logics CO and CO* 
Our possible worlds semantics for qualitative possibility theory takes as 
a point of departure the concept of a possibility distribution defined 
previously. Such a distribution assigns degrees of possibility to worlds. 
Qualitatively, this is simply a ranking of worlds according to their degree of 
possibility, or how plausible these situations are for an agent. 
Our modal structures consist of a set W of possible worlds and a binary 
ordering relation ~ over IV. Intuitively, W is the set of situations an agent 
"considers possible," or assigns ome non-zero degree of possibility. We do 
not intend this to represent epistemic possibility, for there will be worlds 
among this set that are inconsistent with an agent's beliefs. Rather, these 
are the set of worlds an agent could possibly consider adopting, even if it 
changed its mind about certain beliefs it currently possesses. For example, 
W could be the set of physically or logically possible worlds (for an agent). 
We take ~ to be a ranking of these worlds according to their degree of 
possibility or plausibility, the extent to which an agent is willing to accept 
these worlds as epistemically possible, or consistent with its beliefs. When 
w ~ t; we intend that v is at least as possible as w. Intuitively, when v is 
more possible than w we can think of v as being "more consistent" with 
an agent's current beliefs than w, or think of v as a preferable, more 
plausible alternative state of affairs for an agent to adopt should it be 
forced to choose between the two. We define the relations <,  ~,  and >- 
in terms if ~ in the usual way. Such an ordering can be related to a 
possibility distribution zr by equating w ~ v with zr(w) < 7r(v). 
With this in mind, it should be clear that the relation ~ must be a weak 
ordering, or a total preorder, on W. That is ~ is transitive and connected. 4 
This imposes the restriction that any two worlds w, v must have compara- 
ble degrees of possibility. If neither is more possible than the other, then 
they are equally possible. In [20], we develop a weaker logic called CT40 
that relaxes this condition, requiring only reflexivity and transitivity. We 
return to this point in the concluding section. We are thus lead to the 
notion of a CO-model. (We assume P to be the atomic variables underlying 
our logical language.) 
4 _~ is (totally) connected if w ~ v or c ~ w for any v, w ~ W (this implies reflexivity). 
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DEFINITION [20, 21] A CO-modelis a triple M = (IV, ~ ,  ~0), where Wis 
a non-empty set (of possible worlds), ~ is a transitive, connected, binary 
relation on W, and ~o maps P into 2 w ( ~o(A) is the set of worlds where A is 
true). 
A CO-model consists of a set of clusters of possible worlds totally ordered 
by ~,  where a cluster is a set of equally possible worlds. Formally, a 
cluster is any subset ~ ___ W such that w ~ v for all w, v ~ ~ and for no 
strict superset of ~ does this property hold. In Figure 1, each large circle 
represents such a cluster of worlds and the arrows point in the direction of 
increasing possibility. So v is more possible than both u and w (u -< v and 
w < v), while u and w are equally possible. 
If we intend the possibility ranking to respect an agent's current belief 
set, then it ought to be the case that the maximally possible worlds in this 
ranking be precisely those the agent considers not merely possible, but 
epistemically possible (i.e., those worlds consistent with its beliefs). Al- 
though we do not need to enforce this constraint to deal with possibilistic 
logic, we will discuss how it can be expressed in section 3, and how beliefs 
are related to possibility measures. 
We will now define a modal language with which we can express 
qualitative notions of possibility and necessity. Our language L will be 
formed from a denumerable set of P of propositional variables, together 
with the connectives -~, ~ ,  [], and ~. This is a standard modal language 
with one additional modal operator ~. The connectives A, V, and ---- are 
defined in terms of these in the usual way. We use T and A_ to denote 
the identically true and false propositions, respectively. We denote by 




Figure 1. A CO-model. 
Modal Logics for Qualitative Possibility Theory 181 
The satisfaction of formulae at worlds in a model is specified in the 
following definition. 
DEFINITION Let M = ( W, R, ~o ) be a CO-model, with w ~ W. The truth 
o f  a formula A at w in M (where M ~ wA means A is true at w) is defined 
inductively as: 
1. M ~ w A iff w ~ ~(A)  for atomic sentence A 
2. M~w~Ai f fM~wA 
3. M~wA DBi f fM~BorM~wA 
4. M ~ w ~ A iff for each v such that w ~< v, M ~ vA 
5. M ~ w [] A iff for each v such that not w ~ v, M ~ vA 
I f  M ~ w A we say that M satisfies A at w. Such worlds are often referred to 
as ,4-worlds. 
If we think of ~ as an accessibility relation in the sense of modal logic, 
w ~ v can be understood as asserting that v is accessible to w, or that w 
"sees" v. Thus, in this sense, a world sees only those worlds that are 
equally or more possible than itself. The sentence [] A then has the usual 
interpretation: [] ,4 is true at w iff A holds all worlds accessible to w. 
Given our reading of ~<, this means A must be true at all worlds that 
have a degree of possibility at least equal to that of w. The sentence ~ A, 
in contrast, has a nonstandard interpretation in modal logic: t3 A holds 
when A is true at all inaccessible worlds, those strictly less possible than 
w. While the standard operator [] can force certain (classes of) worlds to 
be inaccessible, [] can force certain worlds to be accessible. To illustrate 
the expressive power of CO, consider again Figure 1. If w satisfies [] A, 
this means no ~ A-worlds can be accessible to w. This forces all such 
worlds to be inaccessible; in other words, [] A forces all -7 A-worlds to lie 
above the dashed line. If  the same world also satisfies ~ -7 A, this means 
no A-worlds can be inaccessible, so all such worlds must be accessible. 
This second typeof  constraint cannot be enforced using [] alone. When w 
satisfies [] A /x [] -~ A, essentially a line is drawn across the structure (as 
in Figure 1), all worlds above it satisfying --1,4 and all below it satisfying 
A. This additional expressive power will prove extremely useful in the 
following sections. 
We define several new connectives as follows: 
1. ~A ~df --n D-hA 
<._  
2. <~A ~'df --n [ ] -~A 
3. ~A -~f DA /X t~A 
4. ~A =df ~A V <~A 
(Note that ~A can also be defined as --1 ~ -7 A.) It is easy to verify that 
these connectives have the following truth conditions: 
1. M ~w ~A iff for some v such that w ~ v, M ~ A 
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2. M ~w <~A iff for some v such that not w ~ v, M ~ A 
3. M~ w !3A iff for all v ~ W, M~,  A 
4. M ~,  OA iff for some v ~ W, M ~,  A 
Clearly, OA asserts that A is true at some situation at least as possible as 
the current situation, while <~A requires that A be true at some less 
possible world. [] A and <~A state that A is true at all worlds or some 
world, respectively, whether more or less possible. Validity is defined in a 
straightforward manner, a sentence A being CO-valid (~co  A) just when 
every CO-model M satisfies A at every world. 
DEFINITION [20, 21] The conditional logic CO is the smallest S c_ L such 
that S contains CPL (and its substitution instances) and the following 
axiom schemata, and is closed under the following rules of inference: 
K • (A  DB) D(DA D []B) 
K' ~3(A DB) D(~A D ~B)  
T E3ADA 
4 •A  D [][3A 
SAD ~OA 
HS( [ ]A  A ~B)  D [~(A VB) 
Nee From A infer ~ A. 
MP From A D B and A infer B. 
Provability and derivability are defined in the usual way, in terms of 
theoremhood [2]. 
THEOREM 1 [20, 21] ~-CO A iff ~co A. 
We often want to ensure that all logically possible worlds are taken into 
consideration i our models (for instance in the context of belief revision 
[23, 24] or autoepistemic reasoning [16, 25]). In our current setting, we will 
think of the worlds in a model as those that have some non-zero degree of 
possibility. Ensuring that all situations are captured in a model guarantees 
that every logically possible world is assigned some positive degree of 
possibility (and, as we will soon see, that each satisfiable sentence is 
possible to some degree). For this purpose we introduce the logic CO*, 
which is based on the class of CO-models in which all propositional 
valuations are represented (see also [16]). We think of these models as 
capturing "full" possibility distributions, where no state of affairs is deemed 
completely impossible if it is logically consistent. 
DEFINITION [20, 21] CO* is the smallest extension of CO closed under all 
rules of CO and containing the following axioms: 
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LP ~A for all satisfiable propositional A 
DEFINITION Let M = (IV, R, q~ ) be a Kripke model. For all w ~ W, w* 
is defined as the map from P into {0, 1} such that w*( A)  = 1 iff w ~ ~p(A); 
in other words, w* is the valuation associated with w. 
DEFINITION [20, 21] A CO*-model is any M = (W, R, ~), such that M 
is a CO-model and 
{f: fmaps P into {0,1}} _ {w*: w ~ W}. 
THEOREM 2 [20, 21] ~-CO. A iff ~co.  A. 
2.3. Expressing Qualitative Possibility 
We now turn to the task of expressing relationships of qualitative 
possibility and necessity in our modal language. Recall that we can equate 
the relation v ~ w with the fact 7r(w) > 7r(v) for some possibility distri- 
bution of  interest. In a finite setting, such a possibility distribution induces 
a possibility measure II on sentences via the relationship 
I I (A )  = max{Tr(w): w ~ A}. 
In other words, the degree of possibility of A is simply the degree of 
possibility of the most possible A-worlds. 5 Qualitatively, we are not inter- 
ested in the absolute degree of possibility of A; rather we want to capture 
the relative degree of possibility of  A compared to that of other sentences. 
Clearly, A has at least as high a degree of possibility as B iff I I (A )  > 
I I(B).  If w is some maximally possible A-world, and v is some maximally 
possible B-world, this ensures that 7r(w) >_ 7r(v), or that v ~ w. However, 
since v is a maximally possible B-world, it must be that u ~ w for any 
B-world u. Thus, we can state that A is at least as possible as B iff every 
B-world in W can "see" some A-world. This other words, for each B-world 
u, there will be some A-world w such that u ~ w. Notice that this 
specification does not assume the existence of limiting (or maximally 
possible) A-worlds or B-worlds, and thus applies to arbitrary propositional 
languages and CO-models. We express, this condition in our bimodal 
language as ~(B  ~ ~A) :  whenever B holds, there is some more plausible 
world satisfying A. We refer to this as a qualitative possibility ordering. 
5 If our language is not finitely generated, there are an infinite number of worlds; the 
formulation of possibility measures in terms of such distributions i then problematic, even if 
we take II(A) to be sup{~-(w): w ~ A}. Furthermore, there is nothing in the formulation of 
CO-models that ensures the existence of most possible A-worlds for arbitrary sentences A. 
For instance, there may be an infinite chain of more and more possible A-worlds. While 
there is difficulty in providing numerical possibility distributions in these cases, we will see 
that a qualitative account has no difficulty with such orderings. 
184 Craig Boutilier 
DEFINITION Let M be a CO-model. The qualitative possibility ordering 
determined by M is <PM , given by 
A <PM B i f fM~ ~(BD~A) .  
A is at least as possible as B i f fA <-PM B.6 
The dual of  such a relationship is a qualitative necessity ordering. 
DEFINITION Let M be a CO-model. The qualitative necessity ordering 
determined by M is <eM , given by 
B <EM A iff ~ B ~PM "1 A.  
A is at least as necessary as B i f fB <EM A. 
It is easy to see that B <eM A iff M ~ ~(~ A ~ ~ B). 
Figure 2 shows a CO-model  where A, B, -~ B, and C are each more 
possible than ~ A. Every world where ~ A holds is strictly less possible 
than some world where these other propositions hold. We also see that 
A A --1C is more possible than -1 A A C. A and C are equally (and 
maximally) possible, yet A is more necessary than C. This is due to the 
fact that as we "move up" from the bottom cluster, we find a ~ C-world 
before a ~ A-world. -7 C is more readily "accepted" than ~ A, so C is 
less necessary (or less entrenched). Notice, since there are no worlds 
satisfying (for instance) --1 A A ~ C in the model, we judge all such worlds 
to have no possibility, ~r(w) = 0. Correspondingly, according to our defini- 
tion of  <eM , ~ A A ~ C is (strictly) less possible than any sentence 
@ 
Figure 2. Qualitative necessity and possibility. 
6 We use -<eM to indicate greater possibility rather than >eM to remain consistent with 
[24, 26] and other expositions (where this operator is related to other concepts). 
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satisfied in the model. Furthermore, every sentence in the language is at 
least as possible as --1 A A -~ C. That is, a <Me -~ A A -1C for all a 
(including a = _1_). Thus, we see that II(-1 A A -1 C) = 0, since in (nor- 
malized) possibility measures 1-I(_1_)= 0. Correspondingly, the sentence 
A v C is completely necessary: N(A V C) = 1. 
To give a concrete interpretation for this model, imagine that A, B, and 
C stand for the propositions that Anne, Bill, and Cheryl go to a certain 
party, respectively. We believe that Anne and Cheryl will go, but we are 
not sure about Bil l-- it is completely possible that he will go and com- 
pletely possible that he will not. While we believe that both Anne and 
Cheryl will go, if somehow e were convinced that one of them would not, 
we would say that Cheryl would stay home, since A is more necessary than 
C. Notice that Bill will stay home then (the belief B D C is maximally 
necessary). Finally, though this would be hard to do, if someone convinced 
us that Anne would stay home, we would still maintain the belief A v C 
(again, fully necessary) and conclude that Cheryl will go. 
As mentioned above, one should think of the ~ -maximal worlds in a 
model (those with maximal possibility) as representing the epistemic state 
of the agent in question. In other words, each maximally possible world is 
epistemically possible. In this example, we consider the two lowest worlds 
to be those consistent with the agent's beliefs, while all other worlds 
violate some belief. In a (normalized) possibility distribution, these two 
worlds are assigned degree of possibility 1. Hence, I I (A )= I I (B )= 
I I (~ B) = II(C) = 1, while 0 < I I (~ A) < H(-~C) < 1. In this model, 
the agent believes A /x C. In the next section we will see how belief can be 
expressed at the object level. 
We can show two key results concerning this model of qualitative 
possibility and necessity. 
THEOREM 3 Any qualitative necessity ordering determined by a CO-model 
M is a qualitative necessity ordering satisfying postulates (N1) through 
(N6). 
Proof We take M = (W, ~,  q~) to be a CO*-model with worlds w, v, 
etc. Recall that 
A>EMB means M~(~AD~B) .  
(N1) O(~ A D ~-~ A) is a simple theorem of CO, so A >-EM A. 
(N2) Assume A and B are satisfiable (if not, A >--EM B or B >--EM A). 
Suppose A ~ EMB- Then for some w, M ~w ~ A A [] B. This means 
~at,  for any ~B-world v, v ~ w and M ~v~A.  Hence, M 
[3(--1B D ~-n A) and B ~---EM A. 
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(N3) Suppose A ~eM B and B >--EM C. Then M satisfies both ~(-7 A 
D~>-~B)and t2 ( -~BD~-~ C);thus, ~( -~ADO-~C)ho ldsaswe l l ,  
and A >eM C. 
(N4) Clearly, ~ (± D ~ -I-) is a theorem of CO; and clearly, ~ (fi- 3 
±)  is unsatisfiable in CO (since ~ ± is unsatisfiable). Thus, q- >EM 
±.  
(N5) ~(± ~ ~A)  is a theorem of CO; so for all A, T >EM A. 
(N6) SupposeB>_EM C;so  M~ t ] (~B3~C) .Let  M~w ~(A A 
B). If M~ w --~A then M~w~A and M~w~--~(AAC)  If 
M~ ~B then M~w~-~C (since M~ ~(~BD~-~C)) .  Thus, 
M~-~(A  A C).Hence, M~w ~(A AB)  D~(A AC)  foral l  
w; i.e., A /x B >EM A A C. • 
THEOREM 4 For any ordering ~-~N satisfying postulates (N1) through 
(N6) there is a CO-model M determining the corresponding qualitative 
necessity ordering: A > EM B iff A ~---N O. 
Proof The proof uses the technique of Grove [26]. Let >,, be the 
possibility ordering determined by ~-~N ; i.e., A >,, B iff -7 B >u ~ A. 
For this ordering >= , let a cut ~ be any set of sentences satisfying the 
following closure property: 
I fA  ~and A >7, B, then B ~.  
Thus, a cut contains all sentences with at most a specified degree of 
possibility. 
It is easy to verify that cuts are totally ordered under set inclusion. Let 
~' and :~ be two cuts with A ~ ~' and B ~,~. For any pair of sentences 
A, B we have A >_. B or B >~, A, so either A ~_~ or B ~ ~. So ~'c_.~r 
or _~ __C_ ,~. 
Now we define a model M = (W, ~,  q~ } where W is (as usual) the set 
of all maximal consistent sets of propositional sentences over our fixed 
language, ~p is given by set membership of atoms, and ~ is defined as: 
w ~ v iff for every cut ~,  v n ~ 4: Q implies w n ~' v~ Q. 
Clearly, ~ is reflexive and transitive, and since cuts are nested, it is easy 
to see ~ is connected as well. 
If B is unsatisfiable, by (N5), A >_~ B for all A, and in CO* we have 
that t~(B 3 ~A) is valid. So >_= and -<~,M correspond for any such B. 
Now assume B is satisfiable. 
1. A >_= B implies A -<eM B: Let A >_. B and M ~ B. We will show 
each such w sees some A-world (so M ~ I~(B 3 ~A)). Let the 
family of cuts intersecting w be 
5 ~= {~: ~ n w 4: @}, 
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Then ~ = ~,  the intersection of all cuts in 5 p, is clearly a cut, and 
n w ~ Q (since cuts are nested). 
Case 1: Consider the set {--1 D: D ~ ~}. If this set is consistent with A, it 
can be extended to a maximal set v which includes A. Clearly, ~ n v = Q. 
As ~ n w 4 Q, any cut which intersects v contains ~,  and intersects w as 
well. Hence, w ~ v. (Moreover, v ~ w.) 
Case 2: Suppose 
D 1 . . . .  ,ONE 'S"  , 
In other words, 
{~D:  D ~ ~} is inconsistent with A. For some 
t -  -~D 1 A "'" A ~Dn D -~A.  
F -A  DD 1 V "" V D n. 
Using (N2), we see that D 1 >_~ A or ... D n >.  A This means A ~ g~. 
Now let ~ be any cut smaller than ~', i.e., any -~ c ~. Now consider the 
set { ~ D: D ~.~}. As shown above, if this set is consistent with A, it can 
be extended maximally to include A, determining a world v such that 
_~ n v = Q. If it is inconsistent with A, as discussed above, it must be that 
A ~.@. But since A >I, B, this implies B ~_@, hence that .~ n w ¢ Q~, 
contradicting the fact that _~ c ~'. Hence, there exists a world v satisfying 
A such that whenever _@ c ~ it must be that ..@ n v = Q. Thus w ~ c. 
In both cases, for any B-world w ~ W, there exists an A-world v such 
that w ~ c. Hence, M ~ I~(B D OA). 
2. A <eU B implies A >= B: Let A <PM B. This means for each w 
such that M ~w B there is some A-world c such that w ~ v. 
Suppose a ~ g~ for some cut ~. If B ~ ~, {B} U {-7 D: D ~ ~} is 
consistent (as described in Case 2). Thus, this set can be extended to 
a maximal consistent set w, such that M~w B and wn~'=~.  
Now any c such that M ~v A has a non-empty intersection with ~,  
and by definition of accessibility in M is such that w cannot see c. 
That is, the B-world w sees no A-worlds, contradicting the fact that 
M ~ ~(B  D OA). Therefore, B ~ ~ for any cut ~' containing A; so 
A>~B.  • 
These results show that necessity orderings atisfying the postulates and 
the qualitative necessity orderings determined by CO-models are exactly 
the same. It immediately follows that the space of qualitative possibility 
orderings determined by CO-models corresponds precisely to the set of 
qualitative possibility orderings proposed by Dubois and Prade. 
As discussed by Dubois [7], for finitary languages a qualitative possibility 
measure is compatible with a mapping of sentences into the interval [0, 1] 
188 Craig Boutilier 
iff the mapping is a possibility measure (where compatibility means A >~ 
B iff I I (A )> II(B)). Hence, plausibility orderings in CO are precise 
qualitative counterparts of possibility measures, and entrenchment order- 
ings correspond to necessity measures. Our treatment of possibility and 
necessity generalizes that of Dubois and Prade by permitting qualitative 
orderings on infinite languages (with CO-models serving as adequate 
representation structures). 
3. BELIEFS AND CONDITIONALS 
3.1. Beliefs 
We have seen how to express qualitative possibility and necessity mea- 
sures using two modal operators. More importantly, the relationship to CO 
allows us to exhibit connections between possibility theory and other forms 
of defeasible reasoning. We begin by explaining the connections to belief 
logics and belief revision. The ordering >EM determined by some CO- 
model rums out to be an expectation ordering in the sense of G~irdenfors 
and Makinson [27]. These are weakenings of orderings of epistemic en- 
trenchment [13]. Assuming an agent to possess a deductively closed belief 
set K, an entrenchment relation is an ordering of the elements of K 
reflecting the extent o which the agent is willing to give up those beliefs. 
For instance, suppose A and B are in K and B is more entrenched than 
A. If the agent learns -~(A A B), contradicting these earlier beliefs, the 
agent will reject A in favor of the more entrenched belief B. 7 
We denote by A <e B the fact that B is at least as entrenched as A. 
The ordering on beliefs can be extended to all sentences in Lce L by simply 
requiring that nonbeliefs, those A ~ K, have the least degree of entrench- 
ment. It is easy to see the intuitive correspondence now to necessity 
orderings. An entrenchment ordering must satisfy the following postulates 
[13]: 
(El) If A_<E Band B_<E Cthen  A_<E C 
(E2) If A t- B then A <E B 
(E3) I fA ,  B~Kthen  A_<E A ABorB<e A AB 
(E4) I fK~Cn(_ l _ ) then  A ~K i f fA  <e B for all B 
(E5) If B <E A for all B then t -A 
7 We will see in the next section how an entrenchment ordering determines a natural theory 
of belief revision. 
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Dubois and Prade [9] show a partial correspondence b tween qualitative 
necessity and entrenchment. For any necessity ordering >N , they define 
the set of beliefs associated with >s  to be 
K = {A: A >N _1_} 
Assuming that N(_I_) = 0 for any necessity measure used to "generate" 
the necessity ordering, this means N(A)  > 0. Thus, A is believed just 
when it has some degree of necessity. Entrenchment and qualitative 
necessity correspond if we ignore (N4) and (E5). Entrenchment orderings 
fail to satisfy (N4) only when every sentence is equally entrenched (includ- 
ing _1_); that is, when we are dealing with the inconsistent belief set. We 
will ignore this case and assume that entrenchment orderings are nontriv- 
ial, satisfying (N4). s 
Qualitative necessity fails to satisfy (E5) because certain nontautologous 
beliefs are allowed to be certain or completely necessary (i.e., N(A)  = 1). 
For example, the CO-model in Figure 2 captures the necessity ordering 
where the belief B 3 C is completely necessary; that is, it is as necessary 
as the tautologous belief -1-. This is due to the fact that no B A --1 C-world 
is accorded positive possibility. In general, necessity orderings determined 
by CO-models will not satisfy (E5). But if we consider only CO*-models, 
every logically consistent A has some degree of possibility, and every 
contingent sentence will be less certain than q- . In this sense, CO*-mod- 
els are full, for all logically possible situations (thus, all consistent sen- 
tences) are accorded some degree of possibility. 
PROPOSITION 5 Let M be a CO*-model. Then for all satisfiable A ~ Lce L, 
we have A <eM ± • 
COROLLARY 6 Let M be a CO*-model. Then for all falsifiable A ~ Lce L, 
we have A <eM q- • Thus (E5) is satisfied by the full qualitative necessity 
ordering determined by any CO*-model. 
THEOREM 7 [24] Any qualitative necessity ordering determined by a 
C O* -model satisfies (E1)-(E5).  
Proof The proof proceeds exactly as that for Theorem 4 with the 
obvious modifications for (E5). • 
THEOREM 8 [24] For any entrenchment ordering <E there is a CO*- 
model M determining the corresponding qualitative necessity ordering: A 
<--EM B iff A <e B. 
8 We can capture the trivial ordering by considering the empty "CO-model" as a model for 
entrenchment. Axiomatically we can express the ordering using the inconsistent theory { ±/. 
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Proof The proof proceeds exactly as that for Theorem 4 with the 
obvious modifications for (E5). • 
Of course, the real reason for examining logics of qualitative necessity 
and possibility is to provide a method of expressing and reasoning with 
qualitative constraints on necessity and possibility (i.e., premises) without 
relying on complete knowledge of a possibility ordering or measure. Given 
certain constraints we can determine through logical deduction what must 
be true in all measures or orderings atisfying these constraints. Thus, one 
may express a set of qualitative constraints on the relative necessity of 
beliefs in a knowledge base, or on the plausibility of arbitrary sentences, or 
even arbitrary Boolean combinations (e.g., negations or disjunctions) of 
such constraints. These might then be used to determine the relative 
strength of other beliefs, how one would revise the belief set or determine 
appropriate default conclusions (see the next section). 
The expressive power of CO and CO* can also be used to capture 
notions that are not amenable to direct analysis using a simple language of 
qualitative necessity or possibility (e.g., Farifias and Herzig's QPL). Natu- 
rally, we'd like to express relationships of qualitative possibility. In QPL 
one may assert A >~ B, while in CO we say t2(B D OA) to indicate that 
A is as possible as B. Absolute concepts uch as belief, disbelief, possibil- 
ity, and necessity are important as well. Recall that we take sentences with 
maximal possibility (H(A)= 1) to be the epistemic possibilities of an 
agent. Sentence A is believed just when ~ A is epistemically impossible. 
Thus, belief can be expressed in QPL; for example, "A is believed" is just 
T >.  ~ A. Semantically, in CO, belief in A means that A holds at the 
set of most possible worlds. This can be expressed in our language as the 
sentence ~ [] A, which simply asserts that, at some point in the model, A 
holds at all more possible worlds. Thus A is forced to hold at the most 
possible worlds in the structure (i.e., ~ A is epistemically impossible). We 
can define an epistemic logic based on CO by defining a belief modality in 
this way: 
DEFINITION The connective B is defined in CO as 
BA =dr ~[~ A. 
If we consider those valid sentences of CO where the occurrence of modal 
operators is restricted to conform to the pattern in this definition, we have 
a modal logic of belief. This logic is precisely the modal logic KD45 (or 
weak $5), one of the most commonly used logics of belief in AI. 
DEFINITION Let L 8 be the language constructed in the usual way from 
propositional connectives and the defined connective B. Let PB be the set of 
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sentences CO :3 L B (translating occurrences of 0 [] to 8). We think of PB 
as the belief logic induced by possibility theory, with modal belief operator B. 
THEOREM 9 PB is the modal logic KD45. 
Proof To show that PB ___ KD45, we demonstrate that each of the 
axioms and rules of inference of KD45 are valid in CO. A standard 
axiomatization of KD45 is based on propositional logic plus the following 
[22]: 
KB(A  DB)  D(BA D BB) 
D BA D ~B~A 
4 BA D BBA 
5 -~BA D B-~BA 
Nec From A infer B A 
We show (semantically) that each of these is valid in CO (treating BA as 
<~ [] A). Let M = (14, ~ ,  ~0) be a CO-model with worlds w, v, etc. We 
note that due to the nature of the connective O, M ~ wOA for some 
w ~ W iff M ~,: ~'A for each w ~ IV. Thus, the sentence 8A holds at 
some world in M iff it holds at all worlds in M. 
K: Suppose M ~ 8(A D B) and M ~ BA. Then, for some w,v ~ I4, 
M~w [](A DB)  and M~,  []A. Since either w~v or v ~w,  we 
must have that either M~ [](A A(A  DB) )orM~,  D(A A(A  
D B)). Clearly, then M ~ BB. 
D: If M ~ BA then M : ,  [] A for some v. Now, for all w ~ W, either 
w ~ t: or v ~ w. If w ~ v then clearly M ~ w [] TM A (since M ~,, A). 
I fu  ~w,  then M~[]~A(s inceM~,  [ ]A) .Thus,  M~ ~B~A.  
4: If M ~ BA then M ~w BA for each w ~ I4:. Thus, M ~ []BA and 
M ~ <~[]BA (i.e., M ~ BBA). 
5: Proof as for axiom 4. 
Nee: Obvious. 
Thus, each theorem of KD45 is also a theorem when translated into CO 
(i.e., a theorem of PB). 
To show that KD45 ___ PB, we simply need to show that each nontheo- 
rem of KD45 is not a theorem of CO. We proceed by constructing, for 
each sentence A ~ KD45, a CO-model that falsifies A. 
Suppose A is not a theorem of KD45. Then there is a KD45-model M'  
that falsifies A. From [16], we take a KD45-model to be a structure (W, w) 
where W is a set of worlds and w is a world. Propositional formulae are 
evaluated in the standard fashion at world w, while belief formulae (and 
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subformulae) of the form B A are satisfied by the model (W, w) iff the 
model (W, v) satisfies A for each v ~ W. 
Let M' = (W, w) be a KD45-model falsifying A. We construct a CO- 
model that verifies (and falsifies) exactly the same sentences, thus demon- 
strating that A is not CO-valid. The required model is M = (W u {w}, ~ ) 
(we assume the valuation function is specified by the worlds themselves), 
were v ~ u iff u ~ IV. In other words, M consists of two clusters of 
worlds, W and {w}, where the worlds in W are eflually possible, but more 
possible than w. It is easy to verify that M ~w ~D A iff M' ~ 8A (and 
more generally that M ~w A iff M' ~ A for any sentence A). Thus each 
KD45-falsifiable sentence is falsifiable in CO under the prescribed transla- 
tion. • 
Thus, the natural epistemic logic induced by our interpretation of qualita- 
tive possibility theory is exactly what one might hope. KD45 has some of 
the following interesting properties. It verifies the usual introspection 
axioms: 
BA 3BBA and -~BA DB-~BA 
Furthermore, BA and B ~ A are mutually inconsistent, so an agent's 
beliefs must be consistent. But A and B ~ A are generally consistent, so a 
sentence can be believed even though it is (actually) false. We list here 
some of the various epistemic attitudes an agent can hold towards a 
proposition, and the corresponding constraints these induce on a possibil- 
ity measure. 
• When A is believed it must have some degree of necessity (N(A) > 0). 
In CO this is expressible as B A. The model in Figure 2 satisfies B A 
and BC. The inconsistency of BA and 8-~ A corresponds to the fact 
that at least one of I I(A) or I I (~ A) must equal 1 (or equivalently, 
one of N(A) or N(-1 A) must equal 0). 
• Disbelief is expressed as -1BA. This is true just when N(A) = 0, or 
II(-~ A)= 1. In other words, A is disbelieved iff its negation is 
accorded epistemic possibility. Notice that --1 B A and ~ B-~ A are 
mutually consistent. This corresponds to the fact that possibility mea- 
sures allow both A and ~ A to have possibility 1. 
• If A has some degree of possibility (1I(--1 A) > 0), -1 A cannot be 
certain. This holds exactly when ~A is verified by a model (A is true 
at some world with a nonzero degree of possibility). 
• Sentence A is completely necessary (N(A)= 1) exactly when ~ A 
holds. The model in Figure 2 satisfies t~(A v B) since A v B holds 
at each world (it is completely necessary). ~ A A --1 B is accorded no 
possibility at all. Notice that in CO* only tautologies are completely 
necessary. 
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• Some degree of necessity is assigned to A (N(A) > 0) just when it is 
believed; that is, B A is true. So, in the example of Figure 2, B and 
B have a necessity measure of zero (since neither is believed). A 
and C are accorded some (less than absolute) degree of necessity, with 
A being more necessary (or entrenched) than C. 
To reason effectively with a logic of belief, we need not only the ability 
to express what is believed, but also what is not. The logics CO and CO* 
allow us to express the concept of only knowing. To only know (or only 
believe) a sentence A is to believe A and to believe nothing more than is 
required by A [16]. For example, given a (finite) knowledge base KB, we 
usually intend that KB is all that is believed. 9 If KB ~ A then A is 
believed; if KB ~ A then A is not believed. In usual epistemic logics, 
merely asserting B(KB) does not carry this force. Indeed, B(KB) does not 
preclude the possibility of BA when KB U {A} is consistent, even if 
KB ~ A. In other words, from B(KB) we cannot derive ~ BA. 
To express that KB is believed in QPL, we need only assert that 
T >~ -1 KB (or that N(KB) > 0 in a quantitative setting). But there are 
no convenient and systematic means of asserting that these are the only 
beliefs, or that these are the only sentences that have some positive degree 
of necessity. For example, if we have a knowledge base consisting of only 
the propositions A and C (Anne and Cheryl will go to the party), then 
intuitively we expect our knowledge base to answer that B (Bill will go) is 
possible. No information rules out B (or --1 B for that matter). However, 
just as with the usual belief logics, simply asserting that A and C have 
some degree of necessity does not allow one to conclude that B has some 
degree of possibility. 
In CO*, we can express the fact that KB is all that is believed using the 
sentence 
O(KB) BA 
This sentence nsures that only KB-worlds are most possible (since ~(KB 
[] KB))and that all KB-worlds are equally (hence, most) possible (since 
~(KB ~ [] ~ KB)). Thus, any model satisfying O(KB) is such that the set 
of KB-worlds form the maximal (most possible) cluster of worlds. This 
guarantees that any sentence A is disbelieved if KB ~ A. To see this, 
notice that, since KB U { ~ A} is consistent, here must be some -~ A-world 
in the maximal cluster, assigned a possibility of 1. 
9 We will often use KB as if it were the conjunction fthe elements (asentence). For a more 
complete discussion of only knowing see [16, 24, 25]. 
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Typically, we consider only CO*-models when discussing "all that is 
known," for this terminology suggests that no logical possibilities hould be 
excluded from consideration. When KB is believed, only KB-worlds can be 
accepted as epistemically possible. When KB is all that is believed, not 
only should KB be believed, but every KB-world should be accepted as 
epistemicaUy possible. If some world is not accepted, then there should be 
some belief that excludes this world from consideration, some belief 
falsified by that world. If a world satisfies KB, there is no such belief when 
KB is all that is believed. 
For a purely propositional KB we have that 
O(KB) mco, BA iff KB ~ A 
O(KB) ~co, ~ BA iff KB ~ A 
(see [24, 25] for details). In particular, the only sentences assigned a degree 
of necessity greater than 0 are those entailed by KB. In a natural and 
convenient fashion we can summarize what would require an infinite set of 
sentences in QPL, (or an unwieldy number for finite languages). The 
model in Figure 2 satisfies O(A A C), assuming a language with only three 
atoms (and ignoring the fact that this is not a CO*-model). Thus, O(A A C) 
is a concise way of expressing that only the consequences of A A C are 
assigned a positive degree of necessity. Again, this is crucial since, when 
one specifies some knowledge base KB, it is usually intended that only 
those sentences derivable from KB are believed. 
The expressive power of CO goes beyond this, however, Nothing pre- 
vents the occurrence of nonpropositional sentences in KB. We can have 
belief sentences in KB, and even sentences of an autoepistemic nature. In 
fact, in [25] we show that CO* subsumes autoepistemic logic. For example, 
applying the O operator to a KB containing just 
bird A -~B~fly ~ fly, bird 
allows one to conclude 8(fly). Furthermore, with the ability to express 
only knowing at the object-level, appropriate nonmonotonic conclusions 
can be reached without appeal to metalogical notions like extensions. So 
we can think of CO* as adding to qualitative possibility logic the ability to 
express autoepistemic reasoning. With this connection, of course, degrees 
of possibility or necessity can be interpreted as generalizing autoepistemic 
logic as well. We now turn our attention to this generalization. 
3.2. Conditional Beliefs. 
One problem with epistemic logics is their categorical nature. Sentences 
can be believed or disbelieved, but no "degrees" of belief can be associ- 
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ated with sentences. Even autoepistemic logic does not actually allow one 
to represent the defeasibility of beliefs: its nonmonotonicity is essentially 
due to its indexical nature [15]. 
Possibility theory allows certain beliefs to be held more firmly than 
others. Those beliefs with higher degree of necessity are less readily given 
up than those that are less necessary. This distinction between more or 
less necessary beliefs is captured semantically in CO by therelat ive 
possibility of the "epistemically impossible" worlds. By equating necessity 
with entrenchment of beliefs, it becomes clear that qualitative possibility 
theory determines a theory of belief revision. 
G~irdenfors [13] describes how an entrenchment ordering determines a 
method of belief revision. As discussed above, revision is constrained by 
the general rule stating that more entrenched beliefs should be retained 
while less entrenched beliefs are sacrificed. This process can be modeled in 
CO and CO* as described in [23, 24]. Assume an agent possesses a belief 
set K such that K ~- ~ A. This epistemic state is reflected in a CO-model 
(or a qualitative possibility ordering) where the set of K-worlds is accorded 
the highest degree of possibility; in other words, the agent only knows K. 
Should the agent come to learn A, some revision of K must take place. In 
fact, since --1 A holds at all K-worlds, all K-worlds must become epistemi- 
cally impossible given acceptance of A: the new belief set, denoted K] ,  
must consist of only A-worlds. To "minimally" change K, we simply 
require that the set of most possible A-worlds represent the agent's new 
epistemic state. To express these considerations semantically, we define a 
new connective ~ [23, 24]. We read A ~ B as "revising by A results in 
belief in B." This is true just when B is true at each world in the set of 
most possible A-worlds. When this set of A-worlds is considered to 
represent an agent's new epistemic state after revising by A, the B is 
believed in this new state. This can be expressed as follows, giving rise to a 
modal definition of the conditional connective: 
A ~B- -a :  ~A V 5(A  A [2(A DB) ) .  
It should be easy to see that this notion of revision respects the degree 
of entrenchment of beliefs in KB. In fact, in [23, 24] we show that model of 
belief revision defined in this way is equivalent o the classic AGM 
postulates of Alchourr6n, G~irdenfors, and Makinson [28]. Thus, a qualita- 
tive possibility ordering naturally determines a theory of revision equiva- 
lent to the AGM theory. This connective can be related to our possibility 
ordering as follows: 
THEOREM 10 Let M be a CO-model. Then M ~ A ~ B iff A A B (PM 
A /x ~BorM~ ~]~A.  
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Proof If M ~ D --1 A then the equivalence holds trivially. So assume 
M ~ <~A. Then we have that 
A AB <PM A A ~B 
i f f fo rsomew~ W,M~w(A AB)  A [2~(A  A ~B)  
i f fM~w(A AB)  A m(A DB)  
iff M ~ w A A [2(A DB)  
i f fM  ~ <~(A A [2(A DB))  
i f fM~A ~B.  • 
COROLLARYll M ~ A ~ B iff A D ~ B <EM A D B or M ~ ~ --1A. 
In other words, A ~ B holds just when A A B is more possible than 
A A -7 B (or A is impossible, I-I(A) = 0). 
CO and CO* have been also used as conditional logics for representing 
default rules. In [20, 29] we use the same conditional connective ~,  
reading A =, B as "A normally implies B." We can show that CO*, used 
in this way, captures Lehmann's [12] rational consequence relations and 
the nonstandard probabilistic semantics of Adams [1] and Goldszmidt and 
Pearl [2, 30]. In fact, as we describe in [24, 31], one may view this approach 
to default reasoning as a form of belief revision, in particular, as revision 
of a theory of expectations ( ee also G~irdenfors and Makinson [27]). Thus 
we can define an inferential relation on conditional sentences (or default 
rules) using qualitative possibility, and it will be equivalent to a number of 
other systems of defeasible inference. 
EXAMPLE Let A, S, E stand for "adult," "grad student," and "employed," 
respectively, and consider the following set of premises (a standard exam- 
ple from the default reasoning literature): 
{A ~ E ,S  ~ A ,S  ~ ~E} 
Our conditionals are exception-allowing since A A ~ E is consistent with 
this theory. Preference for more specific defaults is automatically incorpo- 
rated into the definition of ~ as well. From this theory we can derive 
S/x A =~ -~ E using consequence in CO, but we cannot derive S A A = E. 
Also derivable are constraints on permissible possibility assignments, for 
example, it must be that A >= S. It is more plausible that someone is 
simply an adult than a grad student. Also if we assert B A we can derive 
BE. 
The relationship with Adams's and Pearl's e-semantics holds particular 
interest since its semantic foundations rely on probabilistic notions. Adams 
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proposed that conditional sentences can be interpreted as making state- 
ments regarding arbitrarily high conditional probabilities. Pearl [2] has 
suggested that such conditionals can be interpreted as default rules. Let 
A ~ B denote such a conditional sentence. The meaning of a set T of 
such rules (a default heory) is given a nonstandard probabilistic interpre- 
tation. The semantics (dubbed e-semantics) can be presented briefly as 
follows. 
DEFINITION [30] Let T be a default theory. T is e-consistent if, for each 
e > O, there is aproperprobabilityassignmentPsuch thatP (B IA)> 1 - e 
for al iA ~ B ~ T. 
We will say such an assignment P satisfies T to degree s. 
DEFINITION [30] Let T be an s-consistent default heory and A ~ B be a 
conditional rule. T s-entails A ~ B iff there exists a proper probability 
assignment for T U { A --* B} and, for all s > O, there exists some 6 > 0 
such that for any proper assignment P that satisfies T to degree 6, P (B IA)  
~I - - s .  
By presenting qualitative possibility and e-semantics within our modal 
framework we can show the following equivalence. We assume A ~ B is 
some abstract conditional, being interpreted either as ~ in CO or as a 
default rule in the sense of s-semantics (we assume A is satisfiable). 
THEOREM 12 [20] Let T be a finite conditional theory consisting of 
sentences of the form A ~ B, where A, B ~ Lcp L. Then T ~co A --* B iff 
T e-entails A ~ B. 
This connection has also been examined by Dubois and Prade [17]. 
Using CO as the intermediate framework between e-semantics and quali- 
tative possibility allows us to see the underlying semantic ommonality in
these systems. Adams's [1] construction for determining the e-consistency 
of conditional theories can be interpreted as ranking possible worlds 
according to their degree of probability. Given this ranking, it is easy to 
ensure that the conditional probabilities of the statements in the theory 
are as high as they need to be. But this ranking can also be construed as a 
simple CO-model. Our interpretation of CO-models in this paper equates 
this ranking with the degree of possibility of worlds. On either interpreta- 
tion of the models, the same conclusions are derivable from simple 
conditional theories. Hence, degrees of possibility can readily be associ- 
ated with arbitrarily high probabilities. That is, if I I (A )> II(B) then 
P(A)  can be made higher (to at least degree 1 - e) than P(B),  for all 
such A and B. 
The results of Boutilier [20, 29] also show that s-semantics can be 
modeled in the monomodal logic $4. Thus for the purely conditional 
198 Craig Boutilier 
fragment of qualitative possibility theories, representation and inference 
can be performed using $4 (and conversely, if $4 is restricted to its simple 
"conditional" fragment). ~° 
Once we allow Boolean combinations of conditionals, it is not clear that 
the intuitions underlying Adams's approach remain viable. Our semantics 
for qualitative possibility is more compelling in this case. We must also 
contrast our approach with the model of conditional possibility adopted by 
Dubois and Prade [17]. They provide a semantics for (some) Boolean 
combinations of conditionals defined in terms of possibility measures. 
Unfortunately, they equate the "weak negation" of a conditional -~(A :* 
B) with the "strong negation" A =,, --1 B. This is certainly not the case on 
our definition of conditionals. Merely denying a conditional is no reason to 
accept that the antecedent justifies acceptance of the negation of the 
consequent. It should be quite reasonable to say "My door is not (nor- 
mally) open or closed." In CO, the following is consistent: 
~(A  ~B)  A -~(A ~ ~B) .  
Our extension of the conditional language is much more compelling in this 
respect. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have presented two modal logics for reasoning about orderings of 
qualitative necessity and possibility. The expressive power of CO and CO* 
can be used to express constraints on possibility measures in a natural and 
concise fashion (for example, through only knowing). As pointed out by a 
number of people, the numbers attached to propositions by possibility 
measures are perhaps of less importance than the ranking of the proposi- 
tions. We are able to exploit this fact in developing a simple semantic 
account of qualitative possibility. This view allows us to exhibit the connec- 
tion between possibility theory and a number of other forms of defeasible 
reasoning. Furthermore, these modal possibilistic logics provide a means of 
representing very general constraints on possibility measures, since we 
allow arbitrary Boolean combinations of formulae. 
10 We note that $4 structures are precisely CO-models without the requirement of connected- 
ness. While this relaxation is not appropriate in general, simple conditional theories cannot 
express the distinction between the two types of structures. Thus the simple fragment of the 
(mono-) modal logic $4.3 (characterized by the class of connected, or CO, models) is also 
equivalent tothese logics. See [20] for details. 
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The simple modal semantics adopted allows us to explore extensions to 
possibility theory quite easily. For instance, Benferhat, Debois, and Prade 
[5] show how one might circumvent various problems in conditional default 
reasoning using possibilistic logic, and how Pearl's [3] System Z (and 
extensions of it) can be represented. The expressive power of CO* allows 
one to capture the required assumptions directly in an object-level theory 
[21]. We have also begun investigations into the process of revising a 
possibility or entrenchment ordering in the CO-framework [32, 33], rather 
than simply revising the beliefs based on such an ordering. This suggests a 
method for accommodating ew possibilistic information without requiring 
actual belief change. 
A number of avenues remain to be explored. By generalizing the logic 
CO, we can explore weaker types of possibilistic semantics. For example, 
by dropping the requirement of connectedness (obtaining the logic CT40 
of [20]) we are in essence modeling partially ordered possibilistic measure 
sets. A number of other interesting relationships are brought o light by 
this work as well. Possibilistic logic has strong ties to Shafer's belief 
functions [19]. This suggests a link to the forms of defeasible reasoning 
discussed in the last section, a connection we have yet to explore. 
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